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WHITNEY D. HAMMOND,
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Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 8827

ZELPH S. CALDER,
Defenoont and Appellant.
PE'TITION FOR REHEARING

ZELPH S. CALDER
251 South 3rd West St.
Vernal, U ta:h
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
WHITNEY D. HAMMOND,
Administrator of the Estate of
Jim Eskridge, Deceased,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

Case No. 8827

vs.
ZELPH S. CALDER,
Defencwnt and Appellant.
PE'TITION FOR REHEARING
Appellant Zelph S. Calder hereby petitions and
alleges that this court erred in affirming the trial
court:
1. In holding that Rule 12 (j) and 12 (k)
"may have disappeared", which is purely an attempt
to make a retroactive ruling which is unconstitutional, contrary to said rules and contrary to the
reasoning and decisions of this court in Bunting
and Kern per cases.
2. In affirming the trial court's order that
defendant shall pay Eskridge's wheat penalty. Said
order deprived petitioner of his constitutional right
to "due process of law" and impairs the obligations
of a corrtract.
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BRIEF OF AUTHORITIES AND ARGUMENT
The most important authority in support of
this petition is Rule 12 (j) and (k), which read:
(j) When the plaintiff in any action
resides out of this state, or is a foreign corporation, the defendant may serve a notice
upon such plaintiff to furnish security for
the costs and charges which may be awarded
against such plaintiff. Thereafter all proceedings in the action shall be stayed until
the plaintiff shall have served and filed an
undertaking * * *.
(k) If the plaintiff fails to file such
undertaking within one month after the service of notice, or fai'ls to file any additional
undertaking which may be required by the
court within the time specified, the court
shall, upon motion of the defendant, enter
an order dismissing said action. (The above
is italicized by petitioner. )
The clear and unambiguous language stavs this
action from October 18, 1955 until November 2,
1956, thus making a nullity of the trial court's order
and judgment entered October 23, 1956. "Shall be
stayed" was not brought forcefully before the trial
court. The death of Eskridge and the subrogation
of his rights to Colton and Hammond change the
complexion of this case. Petitioner was anxious to
get in possession of his leased premises for early
spring work. This vvas thwarted by plaintiff until
after a year's production was lost.
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The Bunting and Kemper cases, cited in the
court's opinion, extend themselves to help a nonresident litigant from being defaulted. Rule 12 (k)
gives a non-resident forewarning that he has "one
month" to post a bond of $300. The Bunting case
extended the rule 'beyond 30 days. The Kemper case
extended the rule a little further and said even
though defendant has made his motion to dismiss
and the 30 day statute of limitation has transpired
( 42 days), this court still win give relief to this nonresident by way of dismissal without prejudice.
Mr. Justice Henroid, concurred in by Mr. Justice Worthen, dissented to the reasoning of the
other three justices by saying, "Since we require
the p1aintiff to give no explanation for the default
or his delay, it would appear that the rule disappeared except as an instrurnent of harrassment and
expense to one of our own resident defendants at
the hands of another non-resident plaintiff." Mr.
Justice Henroid could have gone further and said
that our Utah constitution, Article 12, Sec. 6, says
that no foreign corporation shall be allowed to do
business in this state on more favorable terms than
a corporation of this state.
In the instant case Mr. Justice Henroid says
"Rule 17 (j) (apparently meaning Rule 12 (k))
may have disappeared, but they (Bunting and Kepner cases) are the law of state and controlling."
3
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The instant case promulgates a rule of law
which extends to this non-resident plaintiff more
than one year from the time request was made to
post a surety bond, more than ten months after
plaintiff's "one month" statute of limitation had
run which was after default; also, defendant had
lost a year's crop through failure of plaintiff to
give up the lease, and had suffered mandamus order
compelling him to pay Eskridge's wheat penalty
without bond, all before plaintiff's bond was posted.
Such a rule of law completely causes Rule 12
(k) to disappear and in so doing strips this defendant of his constitutional rights so zealously guarded
by both the State and U. S. Constitution.
4 Words and Phrases, 2nd series, 376, says,

"A retroactive decision is one which makes and applies a new rule of law and attaches another and
unforeseen liability to a contract after its execution
and is as vicious as an expost facto statute". Chancery v. Baker, 131 Fed. 161, 69 L.R.A. 653.
With respect to the wheat penalty, defendant
received no notice or opportunity to 'be heard on it.
Defendant went into the court chambers anxious
and willing to pay what he agreed to, to wit: 2/7
of the cost of clearing 658 acreas. When he got
in there he found a judgment of $2,256.00 had been
filed against him by the board of arbitrators (R.
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36-7) which he knew nothing about. Also he came
out of said hearing with a court mandate compelling him to pay Eskridges wheat penalty, which
he knew nothing a'bout before he went into the
court chambers. (Defendant is now being sued in
U. S. District Court of Utah Case No. C-10-50 on
this wheat penalty.)
Webster in the famous Dartmouth College case
says by due process of law is meant, "a law which
hears 'before it condemns."
CONCLUSION
This defendant entered into this contract dictated by Mr. Colton in good faith knowing the sanctity of a contract. He wants to he bound by it. Likewise he wants the plaintiff to be bound by it with
equal sanctity.
The unprecedented Eskridge wheat penalty
inflicted on him is more than offset by the cost of
clearing.
We submit that this case should 'be dismissed
without prejudice.
Respectfully submitted,
ZELPH S. CALDER
251 South 3rd West St.
Vernal, Utah
P. S. If this court pleases not to grant this
petition would it stay sending down the remititer
so as to give petitioner an opportunity to bring this
case to the attention of the U. 'S. Supreme Court.
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I hereby acknowledge receipt of copy this
---------------- day of February, 1959.

Attorneys for the Plaintiff

I certify that I mailed 2 copies of the foregoing
reply brief to Attorney Sterling D. q?lton at~ 65,_ ~
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